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INTRODUCTION 
The first juvenile court was created in Cook County, Illinois in 1899.1 It 
was initially established to protect juvenile offenders from the adult criminal 
process.2 As such, the juvenile court was designed to focus more on the welfare of 
the juvenile offender and less on retribution for the offense.3 Over time, the 
general public began to feel that the juvenile court was too lenient. This shift in 
public opinion ushered in a more formalized structure in the 1960s, mimicking 
that of the adult criminal court.4 
The juvenile court has always retained judicial discretion to transfer certain 
cases into adult criminal courts.5 An increase in violent crimes committed by 
juveniles during the 1980s and 1990s led many states to take a more retributive 
approach to juvenile justice. Punishment rather than rehabilitation became the 
                                                        
1
 Juvenile Justice History, CENTER ON JUV. & CRIM. JUST., 
http://www.cjcj.org/Education1/Juvenile-Justice-
History.html?utm_source=%2fjuvenile%2fjustice%2fjuvenile%2fjustice%2fhistory%2f0&utm_m
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primary goal.6 States began to enact statutes that made waiver to criminal courts 
easier.7 Such statutes included the enactment of prosecutorial discretion, 
automatic waivers, and mandatory sentences.8 From 1987 to 1994, the number of 
juvenile cases waived into adult criminal court increased by 73%.9 This trend hit 
its peak in 1997.10 Since that time, the number of transfers has decreased 
nationally. In 2012, however, Chicago hit a five-year high for the number of 
seventeen-year-old adolescents tried as adults.11 
Once waived into adult criminal court, juveniles are afforded all of the 
rights of adult criminal defendants, including the Sixth Amendment right to a jury 
trial.12 The Supreme Court has recognized that the right to jury trial includes a 
right to a jury of the defendant’s peers.13 The increased practice of waiving 
juveniles into adult criminal court has resulted in defendants as young as ten years 
old being tried in adult criminal courts. However, the minimum age to serve on a 
jury in most states still remains eighteen. Thus, courts systematically exclude 
juvenile defendants’ peers from the juries deciding their cases. This systematic 
exclusion of jurors of the same age as these juvenile defendants violates the Sixth 
Amendment’s fundamental right to a trial by a jury of one’s peers. 
This Note will first explain the various ways by which juveniles end up on 
trial in adult criminal court. It addresses the different mechanisms used to transfer 
juveniles to criminal courts and specifically identifies which of these mechanisms 
are present in the Illinois juvenile court system. Second, this Note details the 
national landscape of jury age requirements. It touches on the consistency and 
rigidity with which these age requirements are enforced. It also illustrates how 
waivers are handled in Illinois. Third, this Note analyzes possible constitutional 
challenges to Illinois’ minimum age requirement for jury service in light of the 
number of juvenile defendants in Illinois criminal courts. Fourth, this Note 
outlines policy reasons for why Illinois should consider lowering its juror age 
requirement to fifteen years old. Finally, this note evaluates and addresses 
                                                        
6
 See David P. Farrington & Rolf Loeber, Serious and Violent Juvenile Offenders, in A CENTURY 
OF JUVENILE JUSTICE 206, 226 (Margaret K. Rosenheim, Franklin E. Zimring, David S. 
Tanenhaus, & Berndardine Dohrn eds., 2002). 
7




 Farrington & Loeber, supra note 6, at 227.  
10
 See Easy Access to Juvenile Court Statistics: 1985-2009, OFFICE OF JUV. JUST. & DELINQUENCY 
PREVENTION, http://ojjdp.gov/ojstatbb/ezajcs /asp/display.asp (last visited Feb. 6, 2014).   
11
 Angela Caputo, Minor Misconduct, CHICAGO REPORTER (Nov. 1, 2012), 
http://www.chicagoreporter.com/minor-misconduct#.UvQfWP02FG4. 
12
 U.S. CONST. amend. VI. The Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution states that 
“[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an 
impartial jury.” 
13
 See City of Mobile, Ala. v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 77 n.24 (1980). 
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arguments against having juveniles ages fifteen to seventeen years old serve on 
juries. 
I. WAIVING JUVENILES INTO ADULT CRIMINAL COURT 
A. Background 
Waiver refers to the transfer of a juvenile offender from the juvenile court 
system into adult criminal court. Waivers are a matter of state law and thus are 
established through state statutes. States vary on the minimum age at which a 
juvenile can be waived into adult criminal court. Though most states have set the 
minimum age for waiver in the range of fourteen to sixteen years old, in some 
states the minimum age is as low as ten years old.14 There are several mechanisms 
by which a juvenile may be waived into adult criminal court, including judicial 
waiver, prosecutorial waiver, statutory exclusion, the “once an adult, always an 
adult” policy, and emancipation from parental custody. 
1. Judicial Waiver 
Judicial waiver is the most popular mechanism used to waive a juvenile into 
adult criminal court. Judicial waiver permits a juvenile-court judge to decide 
whether to transfer a juvenile to adult criminal court. As of the writing of this 
Note, forty-four states and the District of Columbia grant judges the power of 
judicial waiver.15 
In Kent v. United States, the United States Supreme Court held that a judge 
must consider nine factors before employing judicial waiver.16 These factors are: 
(1) the seriousness of the alleged offense; (2) whether the offense was aggressive, 
violent, premeditated, or willful; (3) whether it was an offense against persons or 
property; (4) the prosecutive merit of the complaint; (5) whether the co-
offender(s) were adults; (6) the maturity level of the offender; (7) the offender’s 
previous juvenile record and history; (8) protection of the public; and (9) the 
likelihood of rehabilitation through the juvenile system.17 
There are three types of judicial waiver: discretionary, presumptive, and 
mandatory. Discretionary judicial waiver allows the judge to make the decision 
                                                        
14
 Patrick Griffin et al., Trying Juveniles As Adults: An Analysis of State Transfer Laws and 
Reporting, OFFICE OF JUV. JUST. & DELINQUENCY PREVENTION, 4-7 (Sept. 2011), 
https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/ojjdp/232434.pdf (Indiana, Kansas, and Vermont). 
15
 Id. at 3. 
16
 383 U.S. 541, 566-67 (1966). 
17
 This list is exhaustive but not each factor will be applicable in every case. Id. at 567-68. 
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with no preset tendency toward either disposition.18 With a presumptive judicial 
waiver, there is a presumption that the case will be waived to criminal court but 
the juvenile judge has discretion to retain the case, if so persuaded.19 Mandatory 
judicial waiver occurs when a juvenile commits certain offenses at a certain 
statutorily determined age or meets specific criteria regarding his or her prior 
record.20 The key difference between mandatory waiver and statutory exclusion is 
that mandatory waiver is used for cases originating in juvenile court, whereas 
statutory exclusion initiates cases directly in adult criminal court.21 
2. Prosecutorial Waiver 
The prosecutorial waiver is the statutory authority vested in a prosecutor to 
remove a case to adult criminal court. When the age of the offender and the nature 
of the offense committed allow for the case to be tried in either juvenile court or 
adult criminal court, the prosecutor has discretion to remove the case to adult 
criminal court.22 As of the end of the 2009 legislative session, fourteen states and 
the District of Columbia have promulgated statutes allowing for the use of the 
prosecutorial-discretion mechanism.23 
Prosecutorial waiver is unconstrained by statute or case law. Unlike judges, 
who must consider the nine Kent factors when deciding whether to remove a case 
to adult criminal court, prosecutors are not required to articulate any justification 
or adhere to a set of criteria when deciding to remove a juvenile case to adult 
criminal court.24 Prosecutorial waiver statutes are generally silent regarding such 
criteria.25 In the few instances where such criteria are present, the evaluation 
based on these criteria is done by prosecutors behind closed doors with no 
evidentiary hearing or opportunity for the offender to present a defense or 
mitigating evidence.26 
3. Statutory Exclusion 
The third mechanism used to transfer a juvenile to adult criminal court is 
statutory exclusion. Statutory exclusion, also known as an “automatic waiver,” is 
                                                        
18
 Griffin et al., supra note 14, at 2. 
19






 Id. at 5. 
23
 Id. at 3 (Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, District of Columbia, Florida, Georgia, 
Louisiana, Michigan, Montana, Nebraska, Oklahoma, Vermont, Virginia, and Wyoming). 
24
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a state statute that excludes certain charges—such as first-degree murder and 
aggravated battery with a firearm—from juvenile court’s jurisdiction based on a 
predetermined age range of juveniles. Any offender meeting the age criteria 
accused of such a charge is automatically tried as an adult. There are currently 
twenty-nine states with such exclusionary statutes.27 Like prosecutorial waivers, 
statutory waivers may be held in check by the reverse waiver.28  
4. Reverse Waivers 
Some states employ “reverse waivers.” Reverse waivers serve as a judicial 
check on prosecutorial waivers and statutory exclusions. Judges who employ a 
reverse waiver can reverse the decision to waive a juvenile case into adult 
criminal court.29 But, because courts are reluctant to overrule the decisions of 
other judges, reverse waivers are rarely used.30 As of the end of the 2009 
legislative session, only twenty-four states allowed reverse waivers.31  
5. “Once an Adult, Always an Adult” 
The fourth way a juvenile can be transferred into adult criminal court is 
through the “once an adult, always an adult” policy. According to this policy, 
once a juvenile is tried as an adult for a particular charge, that juvenile will always 
be tried as an adult for certain subsequent charges—although which specific 
subsequent charges varies by state.32 This policy is present in thirty-three states 
and the District of Columbia, but varies in how strictly and broadly it is applied.33 
                                                        
27
 Id. at 3, 6 (Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, California, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Illinois, 
Indiana, Iowa, Louisiana, Maryland, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Mississippi, Montana, Nevada, 
New Mexico, New York, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, South Dakota, Utah, 
Vermont, Washington, and Wisconsin). 
28
 Emily A. Polachek, Juvenile Transfer: From “Get Better” to “Get Tough” and Where We Go 




 Id. (citing Dia N. Brannen et al., Transfer to Adult Court: A National Study of How Juvenile 
Court Judges Weigh Pertinent Kent Criteria, 12 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 332, 334 n.2 (2006)). 
31
 Griffin et al., supra note 14, at 3 (Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Connecticut, 
Delaware, Georgia, Iowa, Kentucky, Maryland, Mississippi, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New 
York, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Dakota, Tennessee, Vermont, Virginia, Wisconsin, 
and Wyoming). 
32
 Id. at 2, 7. 
33
 Id. at 2-3 (Alabama, Arizona, California, Delaware, District of Columbia, Florida, Hawaii, 
Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Maine, Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, 
Missouri, Nevada, New Hampshire, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, 
Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Virginia, Washington, and 
Wisconsin). 
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In general, the policy only applies when the subsequent charge is for the same 
offense as the original transfer.34 However, this is not always the case.35 For 
instance, in Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota, and Texas, the policy only applies 
when the subsequent charges are felonies.36 In California, Iowa, and Oregon, the 
policy only applies to juveniles sixteen years of age and older.37 
6. Emancipation from Parental Consent 
A juvenile can be excluded from juvenile court if that juvenile has been 
emancipated from parental custody.38 Emancipation relieves the juvenile’s parents 
of all legal and economic responsibility for the juvenile.39 It also exposes the 
juveniles to all adult penalties.40 However, emancipation still does not grant a 
juvenile the rights to vote, drink alcohol, or buy cigarettes before the normal legal 
ages.41 
B. The Situation in Illinois 
Prior to January 1, 2014, in Illinois, an individual who was seventeen years 
or older was automatically within the adult criminal court’s jurisdiction for any 
felony.42 Illinois was one of only ten states that automatically transferred 
seventeen-year-old offenders to adult criminal court for any felony.43 Prior to the 
January 2014 change, nearly eight out of every ten seventeen-year-olds sent to 
adult criminal court nationally were convicted in Chicago.44 In 2011, the number 
of seventeen-year-old adolescents convicted of a felony in adult criminal court in 
Chicago hit a five-year high.45 
Despite Illinois’ change to the law, offenders seventeen and younger can 
still easily fall within the jurisdiction of the Illinois adult criminal court. The 
                                                        
34








 Emancipation from parental custody means that a juvenile has received a grant from the court to 
be treated as an adult before the age of eighteen. See Emancipation Information, JUV. RTS. 
PROJECT 1-2, 
http://www.youthrightsjustice.org/Documents/Emancipation%20in%20Multnomah%20County%2








 See Pub. Act. 98-61, (eff. Jan. 1, 2014) (amending 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. 405/5-120).  
43
 Caputo, supra note 11. 
44
 Id. (last visited Mar. 15, 2013). 
45
 Id. 
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Illinois Juvenile Court Act of 1987 contains various mechanisms for waiver into 
criminal court, including judicial waiver,46 statutory exclusion,47 the “once an 
adult, always an adult” policy,48 and blended sentencing.49 Additionally, the 
Illinois judicial waiver statute contains all three methods of judicial waiver: 
mandatory,50 presumptive,51 and discretionary.52 Defendants must be at least 
fifteen to qualify for mandatory or presumptive judicial waiver.53 However, the 
minimum age for discretionary judicial waiver is thirteen.54 
Illinois’ discretionary judicial waiver statute explicitly states the court must 
consider the following non-exhaustive criteria when determining whether to 
waive a juvenile to adult criminal court:55 
 
(i) the age of the minor; 
 
(ii) the history of the minor, including: 
(A) any previous delinquent or criminal history of the 
minor, 
(B) any previous abuse or neglect history of the minor, and 
(C) any mental health, physical, or educational history of 
the minor or combination of these factors; 
 
(iii) the circumstances of the offense, including: 
(A) the seriousness of the offense, 
(B) whether the minor is charged through accountability, 
(C) whether there is evidence the offense was committed in 
an aggressive and premeditated manner, 
(D) whether there is evidence the offense caused serious 
bodily harm, 
(E) whether there is evidence the minor possessed a deadly 
weapon; 
 
                                                        
46
 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. 405/5-805 (2013). 
47
 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. 405/5-130 (2014). 
48
 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. 405/5-130(6) (2014). 
49
 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. 405/5-810(4) (2007). Illinois does not grant prosecutorial discretion as a 
mechanism for waiving a juvenile to adult criminal court. Griffin et al., supra note 14, at 3. 
50
 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. 405/5-805(1) (2013). 
51
 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. 405/5-805(2) (2013).  
52
 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. 405/5-805(3) (2013). 
53
 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. 405/5-805(1) (2013); 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. 405/5-805(2) (2013). 
54
 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. 405/5-805(3) (2013).  
55
 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. 405/5-805(3)(b) (2013). 
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(iv) the advantages of treatment within the juvenile justice system 
including whether there are facilities or programs, or both, 
particularly available in the juvenile system; 
 
(v) whether the security of the public requires sentencing under 
Chapter V of the Unified Code of Corrections: 
(A) the minor's history of services, including the minor's 
willingness to participate meaningfully in available 
services; 
(B) whether there is a reasonable likelihood that the minor 
can be rehabilitated before the expiration of the juvenile 
court's jurisdiction; 
(C) the adequacy of the punishment or services. 
 
II.  THE PRESENCE OF JUVENILE DEFENDANTS AS A BASIS FOR A CONSTITUTIONAL 
CHALLENGE OF ILLINOIS’ JUROR AGE REQUIREMENT 
Illinois is one of the forty-six states where a person must be at least 
eighteen-years-old to serve on a jury.56 There is no exception or discretionary 
component to this minimum age requirement. This means that no one under 
eighteen years of age can serve on a jury, even if the defendant is seventeen years 
old or younger. However, defendants in Illinois adult criminal court are often 
younger than eighteen years old—and in some cases are as young as thirteen 
years old. Thus, Illinois’ strict age requirement legally prohibits criminal 
defendants younger than eighteen from having a person of their age included on 
the jury that decides their fate.57 This presents possible constitutional issues on the 
basis of both the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments. 
There are two main ways to challenge a state’s rules and practices 
governing jury composition: a Sixth Amendment challenge or a Fourteenth 
Amendment Equal Protection challenge. The Sixth Amendment requires that “[i]n 
all criminal prosecutions” the accused shall be granted trial by an impartial jury.58 
The United States Supreme Court has held that an “impartial jury” requires a jury 
to be composed of the defendant’s peers from a “cross section of the 
                                                        
56
 See Who is Eligible, AM. JUDICATURE SOC’Y, https://www.ajs.org/judicial-administration/jury-
center/jury-system-overview/choosing-who-serves/who-eligible/ (last visited Aug. 28, 2014). 
57
 For purposes of this paper, “age” will refer to the exact years of age and does not refer to an age 
range. 
58
 U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
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community.”59 This cross section does not need to be directly proportional to the 
community’s composition, but it must be selected “at random from a fair cross 
section of the community” in which the case will be tried.60 The Court has held 
that the Sixth Amendment’s cross section requirement is not meant to ensure that 
the jury necessarily be representative of the community but instead, is based on 
the concept that a cross section of the community helps ensure that the jury meets 
the impartiality requirement.61 
To prove a violation of the Sixth Amendment’s “cross reference of the 
community” requirement, the claim must satisfy the Duren test. In Duren v. 
Missouri,62 the Court held that a claimant must show: “(1) the group alleged to be 
excluded is a ‘distinctive’ group in the community; (2) that the representation of 
the group in venires is not fair and reasonable in relation to the number of such 
persons in the community; and (3) that this underrepresentation is due to 
systematic exclusion of the group in the jury-selection process.”63 The Duren test 
has since become the standard for determining such a violation. 
Although a dictate of the Sixth Amendment, jury composition can also be 
challenged as a Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection violation.64 There are 
two Equal Protection claims that can be used to challenge juror requirements: (1) 
facially discriminatory statutory requirements, or (2) disparate impact. Unlike a 
challenge to a facially discriminatory statute, an Equal Protection challenge 
alleging disparate impact requires the plaintiff prove that there is systematic 
                                                        
59
 Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 526 (1975); accord Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S 145, 156-
18 (1968). 
60
 28 U.S.C.A. § 1861 (1968). 
61
 Holland v. Illinois, 493 U.S. 474, 480 (1990). 
62
 439 U.S. 357 (1979). 
63
 Id. at 364. The petitioner challenged the validity of exempting women from jury service in 
Jackson County, Missouri. According to the County’s jury-selection process, women could 
automatically exempt themselves from jury service by filling out a paragraph and returning a 
questionnaire. The practice resulted in women only representing 26.7 % of the jury pool for the 
eight to ten months proceeding the petitioner’s trial despite women being 54% of the County’s 
population. The Court held that women were clearly distinct from men and that the statistics 
showed an unfair and unreasonable representation of women on juries in comparison to their 
percentage of the County’s population. Further, the Court held that this underrepresentation was a 
result of systematic exclusion caused by the exemption process. Id. at 364-67. 
64
 The Fourteenth Amendment dictates:  
[n]o state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or 
immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any 
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any 
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of laws.64  
U.S. CONST. amend XIV. 
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exclusion of a group from juries and that the systematic exclusion was done with 
the purpose to discriminate.65 
A Sixth Amendment challenge to Illinois’ minimum age requirement would 
likely have the greatest chance of success. Although such a challenge has never 
been successful, recent Supreme Court holdings emphasizing the distinctiveness 
of minors in adult criminal courts strengthen a potential Sixth Amendment 
argument. An Equal Protection challenge to Illinois’ juror age requirement is 
more difficult because the Supreme Court has yet to grant heightened scrutiny to 
minors. However, there is hope for such a challenge in light of the Court’s historic 
trend of expanding groups covered by Equal Protection in juror-requirement 
jurisprudence. The holdings of Miller, Graham, and Roper may provide a basis 
for the Supreme Court to expand jury-service protections to juveniles above 
fifteen-years-old, as discussed infra.  
A. In Light of Illinois’ Various Waiver Statutes, Illinois’ Minimum Age 
Requirement for Jury Service is a Violation of the Sixth Amendment 
 
Illinois’ statutory waivers of minors into adult criminal court renders the 
state’s requirement that all jurors be at least eighteen years old a violation of the 
Sixth Amendment.  
As a group, juveniles ages fifteen to seventeen years old better satisfy the 
Duren test than the other age groups historically analyzed in Sixth Amendment 
jurisprudence. These juveniles can be identified and limited as a group by certain 
characteristics. They also share a common thread of ideas that causes their 
absence from juries to prejudice them as defendants. Further, because they are 
statutorily excluded from jury service, their systematic exclusion is self-evident. 
1. Juveniles ages fifteen to seventeen years old are identifiable as a “distinctive 
group” 
The first prong of Duren requires that an excluded group be identifiable as a 
distinctive group.66 The Supreme Court has yet to hear a case on the issue of 
whether an age group represents a distinctive group for purposes of a Sixth 
Amendment analysis. The Court has also never defined the term “distinctive 
group.” In light of this fact, federal courts have promulgated their own definitions. 
Generally, most courts have found in order to be a “distinctive group” the group 
must: (1) be defined and limited by a clearly identifiable factor; (2) share a 
                                                        
65
 Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 96 (1986). 
66
 Id. 
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common thread or basic similarity in attitude, ideas, or experience; and (3) 
possess a community of interests among its members, such that the group’s 
interests cannot be adequately represented if the group is excluded from the jury 
selection process.67 Unlike some other age groups, which courts have failed to 
recognize as distinctive groups, juveniles ages fifteen to seventeen years old are a 
discrete and easily defined group who the Supreme Court has held share similar 
mental traits and ideologies.68  
a. Juveniles Ages Fifteen to Seventeen Years Are Defined And Limited By A 
Clearly Identifiable Characteristic 
Courts have not provided a specific definition of an “identifiable 
characteristic.” In cases analyzing whether an age group is defined and limited by 
a clearly identifiable characteristic, federal circuit courts have based their 
decisions on the level of difficulty required to identify exactly who should and 
who should not be included in the group, and how arbitrary the limits would be 
for that particular group.69 
In Barber v. Ponte, a defendant challenged his conviction on the grounds 
that there was a systematic exclusion of “young adults”—adults ranging in age 
from eighteen- to thirty-four years old—from juries. The defendant originally 
succeeded at the district and circuit court levels but was ultimately reversed when 
the First Circuit heard the case en banc. In reversing the prior First Circuit 
decision, the en banc panel held that “there [was] simply no evidence in the 
record for determining that people between the ages of 18 and 34 (as opposed to 
some other ages) belong[ed] to a particular group.”70 The en banc panel also 
                                                        
67
 See, e.g., United States v. Green, 435 F.3d 1265, 1271-72 (10th Cir. 2006) (holding that non-
voting drivers who lived outside of Tulsa county did not constitute a “distinct group” because 
neither a choice not to vote or a geographic location create a “common thread in attitude”); United 
States v. Raszkiewicz, 169 F.3d 459, 463-65 (7th Cir. 1999) (holding that reservation Indians are 
not a distinctive group from urban Indians); Ford v. Seabold, 841 F.2d 677, 681-82 (6th Cir. 1988) 
(holding that college students were not a cognizable group under Duren but that women were); 
Barber v. Ponte, 772 F.2d 982, 997 (1st Cir. 1985) (holding that young adults ages eighteen to 
thirty-four were not a distinct group under Duren because they share no common characteristics); 
Willis v. Zant, 720 F.2d 1212, 1216 (11th Cir. 1983) (holding that petitioner was entitled to an 
evidentiary hearing on whether young adults ages eighteen to thirty were not a cognizable group 
under Duren).  
68
 See Miller v. Alabama, 132 S.Ct. 2455, 2464-69 (2012); Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 68 
(2010); Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 569 (2005) 
69
 See Barber, 772 F.2d at 998. 
70
 Id. 
The essence of a distinctive group is that its members share specific common 
characteristics. Yet, what can we identify as the common characteristics of 
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looked for evidence demonstrating that the thinking of a thirty year old was more 
similar to that of an eighteen year old than that of a forty year old.71 Similar 
reasoning has been applied in other federal circuits and Illinois state courts where 
those courts have rejected other age ranges as not representing a distinctive 
group.72 
Unlike other age groups that courts have rejected, juveniles ages fifteen to 
seventeen can be identified and limited by the characteristic that they are all 
eligible to be automatically waived into adult criminal court but are still minors 
everywhere else in the law.73 These limits are not arbitrary. Though a January 
2014 amendment changed the age of adult felony jurisdiction from seventeen to 
eighteen,74 fifteen year olds are all still subject to Illinois’ statutory waiver and 
mandatory transfer provisions. Yet, these same juveniles are not granted any of 
the privileges that accrue upon reaching the age of adulthood—such as the right to 
vote75 or serve on a jury.76 Thus, for Illinois, this group could easily be referred to 
as “criminal-court-eligible juveniles.” 
b. Juveniles Between the Ages of Fifteen and Seventeen Share Basic Similarities 
in Attitude, Ideas, And Experience 
                                                                                                                                                       
people in an age group that spans a sixteen-year gap, covering such dynamic 
years in a person's life as those that are encompassed between the ages of 18 to 
34? To be sure, they are all younger than people over 34. But what is the 
evidence that the attitudes and thinking of, say, 30 year olds have more in 
common with 18 year olds than they do with 40 year olds, or for that matter, 
going to the other end of the scale, that 18 year olds have more in common with 
28 year olds than with 16 year olds? How do we know that there should not be 
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The Supreme Court has repeatedly held that juveniles share distinct 
distinguishing characteristics from adults. Such distinctions have been most 
prominent in cases involving Eighth Amendment cruel and unusual punishment 
challenges where juveniles are sentenced in adult criminal court. Because this is 
the same age group this Note examines, this body of case law is most relevant to 
the “common-thread” prong of the Duren test. 
The Court addressed the differences between juveniles and adults for the 
first time in Thompson v. Oklahoma in 1988.77 In Thompson, the petitioner was 
convicted of first-degree murder for an offense he committed when he was fifteen 
years old.78 The Oklahoma District Attorney petitioned to have him tried as an 
adult.79 Upon conviction, the petitioner was sentenced to death.80 On appeal, the 
Court of Criminal Appeals of Oklahoma affirmed the sentence.81 The United 
States Supreme Court granted Thompson’s petition for a writ of certiorari to 
review the case as a violation of the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition of cruel and 
unusual punishments.82 In a plurality opinion penned by Justice Stevens, the 
Court held that it was cruel and unusual punishment to impose the death penalty 
on a person younger than sixteen years old.83 
The Thompson opinion relied heavily on an analysis of the differences 
between children and adults. The Court’s discussion of the differences between 
children and adults first considered the disparity between the rights of a child and 
the rights of an adult.84 The Court pointed to minors’ inability “to vote, to sit on a 
jury, marry without parental consent, or to purchase alcohol or cigarettes,” versus 
the fact that the fifteen-year-old defendant was allowed to be tried as an adult.85 
However, the Court still left untouched the Oklahoma statutes that provided for 
sixteen and seventeen year olds convicted of serious felonies—such as murder—
to be considered adults.86 
In Roper v. Simmons, the Court expanded the age range of juveniles that are 
too young for the death penalty under the Eighth Amendment’s cruel and unusual 
punishment prohibition to all offenders under the age of eighteen.87 The majority 
opinion identified “three general differences between juveniles under [the age of] 
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eighteen and adults[.]”88 First, the Court cited scientific evidence demonstrating 
that, unlike adults, juveniles share “[a] lack of maturity and an underdeveloped 
sense of responsibility[.]”89 Second, it found juveniles to be “more vulnerable or 
susceptible to negative influences and outside pressures, including peer pressure,” 
and share a “prevailing circumstance that juveniles [have] less control, or less 
experience with control, over their own environment.”90 Third, the Court stated, 
“the character of a juvenile is not as well formed as that of an adult”; their 
“personality traits…are more transitory, less fixed.”91 The Court held that “the 
differences between juvenile and adult offenders [were] too marked and well 
understood to risk allowing a youthful person to receive the death penalty despite 
insufficient culpability.”92 
In Graham v. Florida, the Court likewise stressed the difference between 
juvenile and adults offenders.93 In holding that it was a violation of the Eighth 
Amendment to sentence a juvenile offender to life without parole for a non-
homicide crime, the Court reiterated Roper’s “three general differences” and 
pointed to a “fundamental difference between juvenile and adult minds.”94 This 
reasoning was cited once again in Miller v. Alabama where the Court held that 
mandatory life sentences for juveniles violate the Eighth Amendment.95 
Thus, juveniles ages fifteen to seventeen years old share basic similarities. 
Next we turn to the third requirement of a “distinctive group,” that the group 
possess a community of interests. 
c. Juveniles ages fifteen to seventeen possess a community of interests 
According to Illinois case law, a distinctive group must possess a 
community of interests among its members “such that the group’s interest cannot 
be adequately represented if the group is excluded from the jury selection 
process.”96 Although juveniles ages fifteen to seventeen could have different ideas 
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based on their backgrounds, socioeconomic status, and life experiences, studies 
and case law recognize a shared community interest of juveniles in regards to the 
criminal court system. In Graham, Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion pointed 
out that juveniles possess certain features that “put them at a significant 
disadvantage in criminal proceedings.”97  
First, Justice Kennedy noted that juveniles possess a distrust of adults that 
makes it difficult for juvenile defendants to establish a proper attorney-client 
relationship.98 Second, he noted juveniles’ reduced comprehension of legal 
concepts and the judicial process hinders their ability to establish a proper 
attorney-client relationship.99 Third, this hindered attorney-client relationship can 
lead to deficiencies in the defense process, such as an inferior factual 
investigation, flawed decisions to accept or reject plea bargains, and 
inappropriately harsh sentencing.100 
Juveniles as a peer group will understand their compatriots’ inherent 
distrust of authority and how it can affect the decisions of the juvenile defendant. 
They will be better able to comprehend the juvenile mind and will interpret 
testimony and actions differently than would an adult juror. When these juveniles 
are prevented from serving on juries, juvenile defendants have no one in their 
mental peer group to evaluate their actions in light of the juvenile thought process 
when determining guilt or innocence.  
2. Juveniles ages fifteen to seventeen years old represent a large enough section 
of the community for their exclusion from serving on juries to be unfair and 
unreasonable 
The Supreme Court has recognized that groups based on race,101 ethnicity, 
or gender102 are distinct groups whose systematic exclusion from jury venires 
violates the cross-representation requirement of the Sixth Amendment. In 
analyzing whether the group represents a large enough section of the community 
for their exclusion from serving on juries to be unfair or unreasonable, the Court 
                                                                                                                                                       
viewpoints, and experiences.”). However, this argument is flawed because no group shares the 
same interest on every issue. What is more important is whether the group has a community of 
interest of issues involving the court system, thus, lending itself more to the second half of the 
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has compared the percentage of the community that the group represents versus 
the percentage of the jury pool that the group represents.103 Yet, there appears to 
be no steadfast threshold of what is too large a disparity. 
In Hernandez, the Court recognized that Hispanic citizens represented a 
large enough percentage of the community that it was unfair and unreasonable to 
not have a single Hispanic person on the jury for twenty-five years.104 In that case, 
persons with Latin American surnames made up about 14% of the county’s 
population.105 But only 6-7% of citizens that satisfied all non-racial requirements 
for jury duty had Latin American surnames.106 
If the reasoning in Hernandez was applied to juveniles in Illinois, juveniles’ 
small percentage of the Illinois population would appear to suggest that their 
absence from the jury pool is fair and reasonable. Using 2012 census estimates, 
juveniles ages fifteen to seventeen years old only account for an estimated 4.3% 
of Illinois’ population. Several cases decided in lower courts have held that an 
absolute disparity of 4% is not significant.107 However, such an analysis is 
unnecessary where there is facial exclusion of a group. The Court used the 
disparity analysis in Hernandez to determine whether Latin Americans were 
intentionally being excluded from venires or whether the exclusions were purely 
by chance. When a group is excluded by requirement, courts have not found a 
need to conduct such a disparity analysis, implying that excluding a group 
through an explicit juror-requirement is self-evident of intent to exclude. 
Therefore, even at 4.3% of the population, the systematic exclusion of juveniles 
ages fifteen to seventeen is unfair and unreasonable. 
B. Equal Protection Challenge 
An Equal Protection challenge to Illinois’ juror age requirement would be 
based on the claim that the statute is facially discriminatory. To succeed in a 
Fourteenth Amendment claim based on a facially discriminatory statute, a 
plaintiff needs to show that the excluded class is recognized as one of the classes 
that the Fourteenth Amendment is meant to protect.108 As of now, the Supreme 
Court has never recognized youths as a group warranting protection under the 
                                                        
103
 See, e.g., Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475, 480 (1954). 
104
 See id. at 480-81. 
105
 Id. at 480. 
106
 Id. at 480-81. 
107
 See, e.g., Berghuis v. Smith, 130 S. Ct. 1382, 1395-96 (2010) (stating that a change in 
comparative disparity from 18% to 15.1% was not significant to show a systematic exclusion); see 
also U.S. v. Barlow, 732 F.Supp. 2d 1, 34 (E.D.N.Y. 2010) (holding that 4.26% disparity is not 
significant enough to show an unfair underrepresentation). 
108
 See Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 304 (1879). 
NORTHWESTERN JOURNAL OF LAW AND SOCIAL POLICY [2014 
 
 377
Fourteenth Amendment.109 But the Supreme Court’s failure to previously protect 
age discrimination under the Fourteenth Amendment should not preclude such 
protection in the future. The juror qualifications in the Illinois Jury Act were 
originally passed in 1874 and last amended in 1998.110 Considering the increase in 
federal legislation prohibiting age discrimination and recent Supreme Court 
jurisprudence emphasizing the need to protect juveniles as a group, society 
appears to be progressing to a point where the Court could reconsider the validity 
of a juror age requirement that is lower than the age at which juveniles are 
automatically subject to adult criminal jurisdiction. 
Prior to 1879, a race requirement to serve on a jury was not considered to be 
unconstitutional even though the Fourteenth Amendment had already been 
adopted.111 It was not until Strauder v. West Virginia that the Supreme Court held 
that it was unconstitutional to prohibit African Americans from jury service.112 In 
Strauder, a West Virginia statute limited service on a jury to “[a]ll white male 
persons who [were] twenty-one years of age and who [were] citizens of [the] 
State….”113 In the majority opinion, Justice Strong pointed to the disadvantage 
that a black man would suffer if his peer group—other black men—could never 
be included in the jury that decides his fate.114 Seventy-five years later, in 
Hernandez v. Texas,115 the Court extended this equal protection right to men of 
Hispanic descent and all other races. 
Although the Court in Strauder prohibited the requirement that all jurors be 
white males, Justice Strong’s opinion left room for states to impose other 
qualifications on the potential jurors—including qualifications related to gender, 
citizenship, age, and education.116 However, over half a century later, in Ballard 
v. United States, the Court held that the systematic exclusion of otherwise 
qualified women from jury service was a violation of the Sixth Amendment.117 
Yet, the decision still did not prohibit gender as a requirement. It wasn’t until 24 
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years later in 1975, when the Supreme Court decided Taylor v. Louisiana,118 that 
the exclusion of women from serving on juries was a violation of the Fourteenth 
and Sixth Amendments.119  
In the 1970 case of Carter v. Jury Commission of Greene County,120 the 
Court held that the right to file a cause of action for a violation of equal protection 
based on juror discrimination was present for both the defendant whose jury was 
tainted, as well as the citizens who were being excluded from serving on a jury.121 
In Justice Stewart’s majority opinion, he refers to the exclusion of blacks from 
juries on the basis of their race as being “a brand upon them” and “an assertion of 
their inferiority.”122 He further held that any such discrimination “contravenes the 
very idea of a jury . . . ‘representative of the community,’ composed of ‘the peers 
or equals . . . having the same legal status in society…’” as the defendant.123  
First, legislation prohibiting age discrimination already exists. For example, 
the Age Discrimination in Employment Act prohibits an employer from using age 
as the basis for not hiring a candidate, discharging an employee, or determining 
an employee’s wage rate.124 In the Act’s purpose, Congress points to a need to 
make hiring decisions based on ability rather than age. The same need exists for 
jury service. If the minimum age to serve on jury in Illinois were to be lowered to 
fifteen years old, this would allow juveniles ages fifteen to seventeen years old to 
be included in the jury venires. During voir dire, the attorneys would have the 
opportunity to evaluate each potential juror as an individual to determine if they 
possess the ability and skills to serve as an effective juror. 
Second, the Supreme Court has continued to address the disadvantages of 
juveniles in adult criminal courts and has issued holdings meant to protect them in 
those courts. The Court first began protecting juvenile defendants in adult 
criminal courts by using the Eighth Amendment to restrict the harshness of the 
sentences that juveniles could receive. In Thompson, the Court held that it was 
“cruel and unusual punishment” to impose the death penalty on a person younger 
than sixteen years old.125 In Roper, the Court raised the age mentioned in 
Thompson from sixteen years old to eighteen years old.126  
In Graham and Miller, the Court used the same basis to limit courts’ 
abilities to sentence a juvenile to life without the possibility of parole. In 2010, the 
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Court held in Graham that it was a violation of the Eighth Amendment to 
sentence a juvenile to life without parole for a non-homicide crime.127 In their 
reasoning, the Court held that juveniles have difficulty establishing an adequate 
client-attorney relationship and ultimately have difficulty receiving an effective 
trial.128 In the 2012 Miller case, the Court further limited the context under which 
courts could sentence juveniles to life without parole. Referring to the logic in 
Graham, the Court held that it was “cruel and unusual punishment” to sentence a 
juvenile to mandatory life without parole for any crime.129 
In 2011, the Court addressed protections for juveniles in interrogation. In 
J.D.B. v. North Carolina, the Court held that courts must consider a person’s age 
when analyzing whether that person waived her Miranda rights.130 In the holding, 
the Court again referenced the mental differences between juveniles and adults,131 
and the Court also highlighted the tendency for children to feel subservient to 
adults.132 The Court reasoned that courts couldn’t accurately judge the mental 
state of a defendant at the time of the encounter without considering that 
defendant’s age.133 
Both of these trends suggest that this is the time to reconsider the age 
requirement for jury service. The current minimum jury age was established prior 
to the increase of juveniles being tried in adult criminal courts. Further, this would 
not be the first time that Illinois has reduced its age requirement to better align 
with society’s balance of privilege versus burden. The minimum age requirement 
for jurors used to be twenty-one years old but was decreased from twenty-one to 
eighteen to match the reduction of the military draft age and subsequent Voting 
Rights Act.134 
III. ILLINOIS SHOULD RECONSIDER THE CURRENT AGE MINIMUM 
A. Reconsideration Best Serves the Purposes of the Sixth Amendment and the 
Fair Cross Section Requirement 
The Supreme Court lists three purposes behind the fair cross section 
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requirement of the Sixth Amendment, which is designed to: (1) “guard against the 
exercise of arbitrary power” and ensure that “the commonsense judgment of the 
community” will act as “a hedge against the overzealous or mistaken prosecutor”; 
(2) “[preserve] public confidence in the fairness of the criminal justice system”; 
and (3) implement the belief that sharing in the administration of justice is a phase 
of civic responsibility.135 
1. Inclusion of juveniles ages fifteen to seventeen years old best guards against 
the exercise of arbitrary power 
Some violent crimes have the power to shock the public and create added 
pressure on the police force and prosecutors to seek harsh punishment, 
particularly for juveniles accused of crimes.136 The added pressure and shock can 
cause adults to rush to judgment because they see the child as an outsider. 
The juvenile court was designed to protect juveniles from the harsh 
penalties of criminal court.137 This was based on the belief that juveniles should 
not be treated as adults, but that the focus should be on reform.138 Over time, 
however, the general public became shocked by crimes that juveniles were 
committing, and public policy began to focus more on punishment than 
rehabilitation.139 This shift led to an increase in the use of the once-rare waivers 
from the juvenile court to the adult criminal court. 
Thus, the idea of certain children being waived into adult criminal court 
shows a predetermination by adults that, as a result of their alleged commission of 
certain crimes, these juveniles are the worst of the worst. This creates a stigma 
that may prejudice the jury. As is the case when members of a defendant’s race 
are excluded from a jury, similar dangers arise when juveniles must participate in 
the criminal courts as defendants but are prohibited from serving on a jury. This 
conveys a message of the juvenile’s inferiority that may prevent his right to a fair 
trial. 
2. Inclusion of juveniles ages fifteen to seventeen years old best preserves the 
public’s confidence in the criminal justice system 
Studies show that participation on a jury affects a juror’s future perception 
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of the fairness and usefulness of the jury system.140 A study conducted in Dallas 
County, Texas provided moderate support for the assertion that groups of former 
jurors found the criminal justice system to be “more fair than comparable group[s] 
of non-jurors.”141 There were similar findings in a previous study by William R. 
Pabst, Jr. 142 In Pabst’s study, he found that 90% of people who had previously 
served as jurors either felt favorably towards the jury system or felt more 
favorably towards the jury system than they had prior to serving on the jury.143 
Allowing juveniles ages fifteen to seventeen years old to sit on juries would 
likely increase juveniles’ confidence in the criminal justices system. Because 
juveniles have never been allowed to serve on juries in adult criminal court, the 
best evidence of this phenomenon is the use of teen juror programs in juvenile 
court. There are currently more than 1,150 teen courts operating in 49 states and 
the District of Columbia.144 
These teen courts usually follow one of four models: the adult judge model, 
the youth judge model, the youth tribunal model, or the peer jury model.145 In the 
adult judge model, all parties of the trial process are filled by teens except for the 
judge, such that teens serve as the prosecutors, defense attorneys, and jurors.146 In 
the youth judge model, teens fill all the roles of the court.147 In the youth tribunal 
model, there are no jurors. The teens fill the roles of the prosecuting and defense 
attorneys and argue the case before a teen judge.148 The peer jury model operates 
like a grand jury—there are no defense or prosecuting attorneys. Instead, a case 
presenter describes the case to a panel of youth jurors.149 These teen courts 
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usually consist of juveniles ages eleven to seventeen years old.150 These courts 
were formed to increase juveniles’ perception of the fairness of the criminal 
justice system.151 Though further research is needed, there is some evidence that 
teen courts may also improve teens’ attitudes toward authority and perception of 
the legal system.152 
Much of the research on the effects of these teen courts has focused on their 
effects on offenders.153 Though results are mixed, studies in certain states show a 
reduced rate of recidivism in offenders who were tried in teen court.154 However, 
the fact that these offenders tended to be first-time offenders charged with petty 
offenses may also explain this result.155 
Further, preventing juveniles ages fifteen to seventeen years old from 
contributing to the same criminal system that may prosecute them increases their 
mistrust of that system. In Carter, the Court referred to the exclusion of Blacks 
from jury duty on the basis of their race as “a brand upon them” and “an assertion 
of their inferiority.”156 The Court further held that any such discrimination 
“contravene[d] the very idea of a jury [that] ‘represent[s] . . . the community . . .’ 
composed of ‘peers or equals . . . having the same legal status in society’” as the 
defendant.157 This same rationale applies to juveniles ages fifteen to seventeen. 
By prosecuting this age group but forbidding them from participating in the jury 
process, the State conveys the idea that juveniles are old enough to be punished 
but not mature enough to take part in the judicial process.  
B. The process could curtail some of the negative traits that are associated with 
juveniles 
In Graham, the Court points to a juvenile’s reduced comprehension of core 
legal concepts, institutional actors, and the adjudicatory process as hindrances to 
establishing an adequate client-attorney relationship and ultimately receiving an 
effective trial.158 The Court also mentioned juveniles’ mistrust of the legal system 
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as another obstacle to building an effective defense case.159 Allowing juveniles to 
begin serving on juries at age fifteen is one way to curtail this phenomenon. By 
getting involved in the criminal justice process at a younger age as stewards of the 
community, rather than as defendants, juveniles will gain the opportunity to be a 
part of the adjudicatory process and experience how it works. This could lead to 
several different positive effects. 
Juveniles’ failure to adequately comprehend the long-term consequences of 
their actions is one of the contributing factors to juvenile crime.160 By 
experiencing the adjudicatory process at an earlier age, juveniles may come to 
better understand the potential consequences of the dangerous activities that they 
would otherwise engage in. This could reduce the State’s juvenile crime rate. In 
the case that a juvenile does have a run-in with the law, prior experience as a juror 
may give the juvenile an increased comprehension of the important aspects of the 
legal system and more trust in how the process works. This, in turn, may create a 
more effective attorney-client relationship that boosts the effectiveness of the 
juvenile’s defense.  
C. Lowering the age requirement to fifteen years old furthers the various roles 
that a jury is expected to fulfill 
There are four roles that a jury is expected to fulfill: (1) articulation of 
public values; (2) fact finding; (3) fair decision making; and (4) educating the 
citizenry.161 
The first role of a jury is to decide cases in a way that illustrates the 
community’s values.162 If the jury is to represent the community, it should mirror 
the community that it is evaluating as closely as possible. In adjudicating the guilt 
of juvenile defendants, the court should consider the interpretation of societal 
values of other juveniles through the use of juveniles on the jury. The court will 
best achieve this by including adolescents ages fifteen to seventeen year old on 
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the jury because they recognize the community’s values from the perspective of 
people their age. 
The second role of a jury is to serve as a fact-finder. 163 When finding facts 
in a criminal trial, the jury must listen to the testimony of witnesses and view 
other pieces of evidence in order to determine what acts occurred and the 
defendant’s mens rea at the time of the events in question. With regard to the 
racial composition of a jury, various authorities have found that the more 
heterogeneous the jury’s composition, the higher the quality of the jury’s 
deliberation process and ultimate decisions.164 There is no reason to believe that 
having a jury that is more heterogeneous with regard to age would not have the 
same effect. By decreasing the minimum age of jurors to include persons as 
young as fifteen, there would be more perspectives which would, in turn, promote 
a greater breadth of recollection, different ways of organizing information, and 
more considerations than would be present in a more homogenized group. This 
added diversity would better allow the jury to serve its purpose as an effective 
fact-finder. 
The third role of a jury is to be a fair decision maker in both fact and 
appearance.165 In addition to accurately deliberating on findings of fact, it is 
important that juries’ decisions appear fair to the community. It appears 
inherently unfair for a state to decide that a certain group is old enough to be 
penalized through the adult criminal court but too young to participate in the 
adjudicatory process as a juror. By changing the state’s juror age requirement to 
match the youngest age at which a juvenile can be automatically waived to adult 
criminal court, the jury decision-making function gains fairness in both practice 
and appearance.  
The fourth role of a jury is to educate the citizenry.166 One of the main 
motivations behind a jury system is to give ordinary citizens an opportunity to 
participate in their government.167 Juries give citizens the opportunity to 
participate in the law, and by doing so, juries promote the acceptance of the laws 
by the citizens.168 Exclusion of a class from serving on a jury excludes that class 
from receiving that learning experience and gaining that feeling of acceptance 
towards the State’s laws. Thus, the role of educating the citizenry is best served 
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by including as many of the classes that are subject to criminal prosecution in the 
juror process as possible. By lowering the minimum age to serve on a jury to 
fifteen years old, the jury function would better educate the citizenry that is 
subject to its laws. Further, juveniles eventually grow to be adults who are 
expected to participate in jury duty. Earlier participation and education about the 
criminal justice system would benefit the youths by immersing them in their civic 
duty before they become jaded by the system’s appearance of unfairness. 
D. Juveniles’ unfamiliarity with issues of law may actually be a benefit for the 
pure “fact-finding” function of a juror 
One of the difficulties of maintaining an impartial jury is ensuring that the 
jury sticks to its function of fact-finding instead of grappling with issues of law—
which are supposed to be decided by the judge.169 It is important that matters of 
law be decided and dictated by the judge in the form of jury instructions. As jury 
instructions, and errors therein, can often be a basis for appeal, it is key that a jury 
follows them without bringing in their own ideas on concepts of law. A juvenile’s 
relative inexperience with law allows him to absorb the jury instructions given by 
the judge without bringing in outside notions of law. The counter to this argument 
will be discussed in a later section. 
IV. WHY THE CASE FOR JUVENILES IS HARD 
A. The Catch-22 of the juvenile mind 
One of the biggest challenges to lowering the juror age requirement in 
Illinois to fifteen years old is the nature of what makes the juvenile mind different 
from the adult mind. As stated above, one of the elements required to be 
considered a distinctive group for purposes of the Sixth Amendment’s cross-
representation requirement is that the group share a common thread or basic 
similarity in attitude, ideas, or experience.170 According to the Supreme Court, the 
characteristics that define adolescents as a group are: a “lack of maturity and an 
underdeveloped sense of responsibility”; an increased vulnerability “to negative 
influences and outside pressures, including peer pressures”; “less control, or less 
experience with control, over their own environment”; and an under-formed 
                                                        
169
 See Marder, supra note 161, at 1067 (citing Stephen C. Yeazell, The New Jury and the Ancient 
Jury Conflict, 1990 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 87, 92 (1990)). 
170
 People v. Treece, 511 N.E.2d 1361, 1369 (Ill. App. Ct. 1987) (citing Barber v. Ponte, 772 F.2d 
982, 997 (1st Cir. 1985)). 
Vol. 9.2]   Wesley Morrissette 
 
 386
character.171 The ability to set requirements on who may serve on a jury is 
predicated on the need to ensure that all those who serve on a jury are adequately 
equipped to do so.172 Unfortunately, many of the common traits that distinguish 
juveniles as a group also make them unattractive jurors. 
Scientific research supports this school of thought. Juveniles generally 
focus on short-term effects and undervalue long-term consequences.173 
Developmental neuroscience shows that the brain changes during the transition 
from childhood to adolescence. During this transition, emotional regulation shifts 
to peer groups and peer influence.174 
The requirements for jury duty are designed to ensure that members of the 
jury possess adequate intellect, maturity, and decision making to serve as 
effective jurors.175 The immaturity of the juvenile mind may be a hindrance to this 
goal. Juveniles’ failure to fully grasp long-term consequences could possibly lead 
to juvenile jurors making rash judgments or taking juror responsibility less 
seriously because he does not understand the gravity of what he are doing. 
Because of their high susceptibility to peer pressure, juveniles may also be more 
prone to juror tampering. They might feel an increased pressure to acquit certain 
people for fear of facing admonishment by their community or possible physical 
retaliation, maybe even more so than other jurors. 
It is important, however, to recognize that much of juveniles’ lack of 
maturity comes from a lack of life experience. Adults tend to be more mature and 
make better decisions because they have seen more life events and learned from 
them. An increased role in civic responsibility may create earlier maturation in 
juveniles. This idea gains support from the Mofitt theory that much juvenile 
delinquency is a result of juveniles trying to find a sense of independence by 
fulfilling adult roles that they are not legally allowed to yet, such as drinking and 
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smoking.176 Mofitt goes on to say that such delinquency lessens with an increased 
ability to legitimately fill these roles.177 By participating on juries, juveniles 
would get a chance to fill an adult role. 
Current Illinois law already acknowledges that some juveniles may be ready 
for adult roles in society prior to reach the official age of adulthood. For example, 
Illinois’ compulsory education statute contains an exemption that allows juveniles 
ages sixteen years old and older to withdraw from school with proof of 
employment.178 Not only does this show a recognition that juveniles can 
sometimes handle more adult responsibilities, it also shows an example of how 
certain juveniles may gain more real world experience at an earlier age, possibly 
spurring earlier emotional and mental maturation. 
B. Logistics 
Another difficulty in lowering the age requirement to fifteen years for jurors 
in Illinois is the logistical issue of having people committed to attending a trial 
when they are supposed to be in school. Unlike most eighteen year olds, juveniles 
ages fifteen to seventeen years old are required by law to be in school.179 In 
Illinois, state trials are only conducted on weekdays; thus, jury duty would be in 
direct conflict with the legal requirement for those juveniles to be in school. 
Although jury duty often conflicts with adults’ obligations to work, employment 
law protects jurors from being penalized for fulfilling their jury duties. 
This problem could be easily mitigated. First, courts often have an idea of 
how long a trial is scheduled to take. With this knowledge, courts could simply 
excuse juvenile jurors from trials that will last more than a few days. Second, in 
the current age of online lectures and electronic resources, schools could easily 
have their teachers post lectures and assignments online so that juveniles serving 
jury duty can learn on their own time. Further, there are many excused reasons for 
missing school, such as a doctor’s appointment. Even in its current state, Illinois’s 
compulsory education statute allows for juveniles ages sixteen years old and 
above to withdraw from school with parental permission and proof of 
employment.180 An amendment could be made to Illinois’ compulsory education 
statute mandating that jury service not be a violation of the attendance policy. It is 
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reasonable to believe that excusing a few days of class for jury duty is a far less 
extreme measure than completely withdrawing from school. 
CONCLUSION 
The Supreme Court has never prohibited juveniles ages fifteen to seventeen 
years old from being tried in adult criminal courts while also affirming state juror 
requirements that prohibit those juveniles from serving on juries.181 However, the 
case law and reasoning that allows this exclusion has not kept up with the 
changing landscape of Illinois’ criminal justice system. The minimum age 
requirement of eighteen, which has become so ingrained in United States courts, 
was passed prior to the drastic increase in the number of juveniles whose fates are 
now being decided by these adult criminal courts. Although national figures have 
shown a decrease in the number of juveniles being tried in these courts, Illinois is 
experiencing a boom, especially in the state’s most populous and violent city, 
Chicago. 
Given the continuing debate regarding punishing juveniles as adults, the 
fact that juveniles are not given that same adult opportunities to participate in the 
positive civic duty of jury service further exacerbates the appearance of injustice 
and diminishes the credibility of the criminal court. The best way to give the 
appearance of fairness and justice is to allow juveniles to participate in both sides 
of the adjudicatory process. If fifteen year olds can be automatically waived to 
adult court, it is only reasonable that they also be allowed to serve on the juries of 
those courts. Juveniles should be given the same opportunities as adults to have 
their fates decided by juries of their “peers,” not their superiors. This is the 
intention of the Sixth Amendment. 
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